This paper explores the optimal design of subsidies for hiring unemployed workers (`employment vouchers' for short) in the context of a simple dynamic model of the labour market. Focusing on the short-term and long-term effects of the vouchers on employment and unemployment, the analysis shows how the optimal policy depends on the rates of hiring and firing, and on the problems of displacement and deadweight. It also examines the roles of the government budget constraint and of the level of unemployment benefits in optimal policy design. We calibrate the model and evaluate the effectiveness of employment vouchers in reducing unemployment for a wide range of feasible parameters.
INTRODUCTION
Over the past two decades, subsidies for hiring unemployed workers have become an increasingly favoured tool for dealing with unemployment. The subsidies may be granted to employers or employees and they may be implemented through a wide variety of policy instruments, such as tax breaks, grants, and so on. Since these policies all have analogous effects on labour market activities and government budgetary outlays, this paper groups them together under the broad heading of`employment vouchers'.
Employment vouchers have some well-known advantages in comparison with other policy instruments to tackle high unemployment. First, the vouchers are an appropriate way of dealing with a wide variety of market failures that lead to excessive real wages and thereby depress labour demand. When the cost of labour is inefficiently high, employment vouchers are a straightforward instrument to reduce labour costs, regardless of whether the excessive costs are due to, say, efficiency wage, insider±outsider, or labour union considerations. Second, employment vouchers operate as an automatic stabilizer in the labour market, in contrast to discretionary subsidies to groups of workers with particular characteristics. For example, if unskilled service sector workers have the highest unemployment rate initially and subsequently unemployment rises among semi-skilled manufacturing labour, then the targeting of the employment vouchers will automatically shift from the first group to the second. This paper explores the optimal design of employment vouchers in the context of a simple, empirically implementable, dynamic macroeconomic model of the labour market. We aim to analyse the short-and long-term effects of this policy on employment and unemployment, identify the major channels whereby this policy works, examine the main obstacles inhibiting the effectiveness of the policy, and investigate the role of the government budget constraint on policy formation.
Most theoretical and empirical studies about the effectiveness and desirability of employment vouchers have been conducted in the context of static analytical frameworks. 1 At best, work along these lines can isolate only the short-run effects of the policy. However, as our analysis below shows, employment vouchers can be expected to have dynamic effects, and these effects are likely to lead to outcomes that differ significantly from what may be expected to occur in the short run. The main reason is that incumbent employees' probabilities of being retained usually exceed the unemployed workers' probabilities of being hired. Consequently, provided that employment vouchers stimulate hiring more than firing, they improve people's longer-run job prospects and these long-term effects can dwarf the short-term ones.
The existing macro literature on subsidizing employment has also tended to ignore the full effects of these subsidies on the government's budget. It is standard to assume that the aggregate amount the government spends on the subsidies must be equal to its aggregate tax receipts (e.g. receipts from payroll taxes). 2 This approach is seriously incomplete, for a major cost of unemployment to the government comes from unemployment benefits and other associated welfare state entitlements, and when the subsidies reduce unemployment the resulting reduction in the government's unemployment benefit payments must be included in the government's budget constraint as well.
Furthermore, the literature on empirical evaluations of employment voucher schemes tend to focus on just two factors limiting the effectiveness of this policy: deadweight (vouchers given to people who would have found jobs anyway) and displacement 3 (subsidized employees displacing current employees who are not subsidized). Our analysis shows, however, that although these factors are important, they are far from constituting a comprehensive account of the main obstacles on this policy. Thus policymakers who focus predominantly on them will gain a misleading picture of the underlying problem and will be led inappropriate policy responses. Our analysis permits a more balanced assessment of the channels whereby employment vouchers reduce unemployment.
Our analysis concentrates on six major determinants of optimal employment vouchers:
(1) deadweight (represented by the hiring rate in the absence of vouchers);
(2) hiring responsiveness (the effect of vouchers on the hiring rate);
(3) autonomous job loss (depicted by the flow from employment into unemployment in the absence of the vouchers); (4) displacement (represented by the effect of the vouchers on the flow from employment to unemployment); (5) unemployment benefits; and (6) the budgetary allocation for the voucher policy (the government budget deficit or surplus that is to be generated through the policy).
Surprisingly enough, the existing theoretical literature on the macroeconomic effects of subsidizing employment has paid scant attention to the interrelated roles of these factors in employment policy formulation. This paper covers these important neglected issues. Our aim is to construct a model that is easy to use in the practical design of employment voucher policy.
In particular, our model is meant to provide a computational framework for evaluating the effectiveness of the policy, given only a small number of empirically identifiable parameters. The existing dynamic models 4 for employment policy evaluation tend to be black boxes, whose predictions depend on a larger number of microeconomic parameters that are difficult to assess. The underlying problem is that general equilibrium models derived from microeconomic foundations are generally difficult to parameterize reliably for policy prediction purposes. In this paper we avoid this difficulty by adopting a simple, empirically tractable methodology. The dynamic effects arising from the difference between retention and hiring probabilities can be captured straightforwardly through a model of the labour market in which workers' transitions between employment and unemployment are governed by a Markov process. We specify the transition probabilities as simple, identifiable functions of the employment vouchers, without specifying an underlying, fullblown choice-theoretic foundation. (We do, however, provide an illustrative microfoundations model in Appendix E.) Although this methodology imposes some limits on the applicability of our results (to be discussed below), it does have the advantage of simplicity and empirical tractability.
4.
See, for instance, Hoon and Phelps (1996) , Millard and Mortensen (1997) , Mortensen and Phelps (1994) , Phelps and Hoon (1992), and Pissarides (1994) .
In this context, the paper focuses on a simple, useful policy problem, namely, to find the magnitude of employment vouchers that minimize the level of unemployment, subject to a government budget constraint. It is with reference to this policy objective that we explore the properties of the`optimal' employment voucher. We begin by concentrating on self-financing employment vouchers, i.e. those whose cost to the government does not exceed the corresponding amount saved on unemployment benefits. We then examine how the optimal policy is affected by a change in the government budget constraint, viz. a switch from a self-financing policy to vouchers on which the government does not spend more than a fixed amount, which could be positive (implying budget deficit from the voucher policy) or negative (implying a surplus).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our Markov model of the labour market and describes the government's budget constraint. Section 3 focuses attention on some particularly important dynamic implications of employment vouchers by considering the simple case in which the hiring probability depends linearly on the voucher and the firing probability is constant, so that there is no displacement. In this context, we derive the optimal long-run, self-financing vouchers. This analysis highlights the role of deadweight in the design of employment vouchers. Section 4 solves the policy problem when both the hiring and firing probabilities depend linearly on the voucher. This model sheds light on the joint role of displacement and deadweight costs in subsidy design. Section 5 calibrates the model and evaluates the effectiveness of the policy for a wide range of feasible parameters. Finally, Section 6 concludes. (Appendix C derives bounds for the vouchers when the hiring and firing probabilities have more general functional forms. Appendix D moves beyond self-financing employment vouchers by deriving the optimal policy when the government runs a specified policy-induced deficit or surplus.)
THE UNDERLYING MODEL
Time is discrete and workers can be in one of two states: employment or unemployment. Let h be the probability that an unemployed worker will be hired, and f be the probability that an employed worker will become unemployed (e.g., be`fired'). The labour force L is assumed constant through time. 5 Let n t be employment rate in period t (the level of employment as a fraction of the labour force) and u t be the unemployment rate (the level of unemployment as a fraction of the labour force) in that period. Thus: n t u t 1 1
The employment and unemployment equations
The change in employment Án t n t À n tÀ1 is the difference between the number of people hired and the number of people fired: Án t hu tÀ1 À fn tÀ1 . Obversely, the change in unemployment Áu t u t À u tÀ1 is Áu t fn tÀ1 À hu tÀ1 . Thus the evolution of the labour market may be described by the following system:
where S t is a vector of labour market states:
and T is the Markov matrix of transition probabilities:
(Illustrative microfoundations for the hiring and firing rates are given in Appendix E.)
We now turn to the effect of employment vouchers on this system. We assume that each unemployed worker receives the same employment voucher, granted for one period. Let v be the`voucher ratio', i.e. the ratio of the employment voucher to the wage. 6 An increase in the voucher ratio stimulates both hiring and firing:
(Firing is encouraged through the displacement of incumbent employees by subsidized new entrants. 7 ) These hiring and firing functions are reduced forms; they represent the degree to which the employment voucher affects the employees' incentives to work and the firms' incentives to employ, taking into account heterogeneity of jobs and workers, self-selection bias, and so on. 8
6.
In what follows, all incentives to hire and fire will be specified relative to the wage. 7.
In practice, displacement is to some degree a matter of policy choice since the policy-maker can reduce displacement, say, by fining employers who can be shown to have replaced incumbent employees by new recruits. The greater the degree to which anti-displacement provisions are monitored and enforced, the less the firing rate will depend on the vouchers and, since these provisions generally raise the cost of recruitment, they also reduce the responsiveness of the hiring rate to the vouchers. 8.
For this reason it is unnecessary for us to specify how the hiring rates and the firing rates differ across groups of workers (e.g., incumbents versus subsidized workers).
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By equations (1) to (4) above, we obtain the following employment equation, showing how the government can affect the long-run unemployment rate 9 by varying the voucher ratio v:
The corresponding unemployment equation is:
The voucher stimulates steady-state (long-run) employment so long as it raises the hiring rate by proportionately more than it raises the firing rate. 10
In what follows, we plausibly take this to be the case. Some have argued that, in the long run, any wage subsidy leads to an equal increase in the wage that employees receive, and consequently wage subsidies have no effect on long-run labour costs or long-run employment. (For example, Layard et al., (1991, p. 108) , use a version of this argument, applied to taxes on labour.) The argument is that if the wage is the outcome of a Nash bargain and if the subsidy falls in equal proportions on the employees' take-home pay and on their fall-back position, then the subsidy can be factored out of the Nash maximand, leaving the wage paid by the firm unchanged. This argument, however, is unlikely to hold in practice, particularly for vouchers to previously unemployed workers. First, these vouchers may be expected to induce people to move from inactivity to active job search, thus raising the supply of labour, reducing wages and raising employment. Second, the fall-back position of previously unemployed people depends on unemployment benefits, minimum wages and welfare state entitlements, and the latter need not necessarily rise in proportion to the vouchers. Third, in the transition to the long run, the vouchers may be expected to raise the number of employees relative to the number of unemployed people, and if (as is generally the case) the retention 9.
For practical policy purposes, focusing on the long-run steady state is not as serious a limitation as it may appear at first sight, since in general it is politically and institutionally infeasible to devise detailed rules whereby employment vouchers vary through time in response to changing labour market conditions. 10.
To see this, differentiate equation (5a),
and observe that when condition (6) is satisfied, the numerator is positive. rate of employees tends to exceed the hiring rate for the unemployed (at any given real wage) the vouchers will then raise the long-run employment rate. Finally, the vouchers will generally raise the recruits' take-home pay relative to their non-wage income and thereby induce them to work harder, shirk less and be less motivated to quit, thereby reducing the profit-maximizing efficiency wage. For these various reasons, we will assume here that there is a positive long-run equilibrium relation between the hiring rate and the magnitude of the employment voucher.
The government budget constraint
As noted, the government's policy problem is to find the magnitude of the voucher that minimizes the unemployment rate, subject to the government budget constraint. We specify this constraint straightforwardly as follows.
Letting uv be the long-run unemployment rate as a function of the voucher ratio v, the`voucher cost' (total cost of vouchers to the government) is vhvuv, since the number of unemployed people hired in each period is hvuv. This cost must be set against the`voucher revenue', which is the total amount that the government saves on unemployment benefits owing to the voucher-induced rise in the employment rate. Let uv and u0 be the long-run unemployment rates in the presence and absence of the voucher, respectively. Let the replacement ratio (the ratio of the unemployment benefit to the wage) b be a positive constant. Then the amount that the employment vouchers enable the government to save on unemployment benefit disbursements is bu0 À uv.
Finally, let G be the maximum lump-sum cost per capita of the employment policy to the government, per capita, relative to the wage w. (G could be positive, zero or negative.) Consequently, the government budget constraint (GBC) is: vhvuv G bu0 À uv 7
i.e. the per capita cost of the employment vouchers vhvuv must not exceed the maximum per capita cost of the policy to the government G plus voucher revenue bu0 À uv from reduced unemployment. Net government spending on the employment vouchers, vhU buvÀ u0, need not be not monotonic in v: at low enough levels of the voucher v (and high enough levels of the replacement ratio b) a rise in the voucher may actually reduce government spending on the vouchers, since the rise in the voucher may reduce employment sufficiently and to generate more voucher revenue bu0 À uv than voucher cost vhU. But provided that the voucher cost rises faster with the level of the voucher than does voucher revenue, then at higher levels of the voucher ratio (and lower levels of the replacement ratio) an increase in the voucher ratio will of course raise government spending, and at the policy optimum ± when unemployment is minimized ± the optimal employment voucher ratio v v Ã is such that the government budget constraint (equation (7)) holds as an equality:
Observe that the greater is net government spending G, the greater is the maximum voucher ratio that satisfies the government budget constraint, and consequently the greater is the employment rate generated by the policy. In what follows, we will assume that G is sufficiently large so that there exists a voucher ratio v b 0 such that the government budget constraint is satisfied. 11 Then, by the employment equation (5a) and the government budget constraint equation (7 H ), the optimal voucher ratio v Ã is implicitly given by:
Equation (8) defines optimal voucher policy implicitly. In the next two sections, we derive the optimal policy explicitly for particular parametric forms of the hiring function hv and firing function f v.
OPTIMAL EMPLOYMENT VOUCHERS IN THE ABSENCE OF DISPLACEMENT
We focus on the case of balanced-budget voucher programmes: 12 G 0. We assume that:
• hire rates are given by the linear equation:
• fire rates are independent of the voucher ratio (i.e., there is no displacement):
where stands for`employment' and ! for`job loss'. The coefficient 0 is deadweight (the hiring rate in the absence of the voucher), 1 is hiring responsiveness (the effect of the voucher on the hiring rate); and ! 0 is autonomous job loss (the rate at which employees become unemployed).
11.
We have already assumed that equation (6) holds. In this case, the optimal voucher reduces unemployment. 12.
The case of G b 0 involves more algebra and is covered in Appendix D.
The optimal voucher
Substituting the hiring function equation (9a) and the firing function equation (9b) into the unemployment equation (5b), we obtain the relation between unemployment and the voucher ratio:
Thus, the voucher cost C may be expressed as:
and the voucher revenue R becomes:
For a balanced budget policy G 0, the government budget constraint simply provides that the voucher cost must not exceed voucher revenue (by (11) and (12)):
Since the voucher stimulates employment, 13 the optimal voucher (at an interior optimum 14 ) satisfies this constraint with an equality. Expressing these terms as magnitudes in units of the voucher ratio per person unemployed (i.e., dividing both sides of equation (13) by v and by ! 0 a! 0 0 1 v), the government budget constraint becomes:
i.e. the voucher cost (per unemployed person, in voucher units) is not greater than the voucher revenue (measured in the same terms). (1) and (10), the employment equation becomes:
By equations
Differentiating this equation, we find that the voucher ratio stimulates employment:
There are two further constraints on the size of the voucher, namely a non-negativity constraint, v ! 0, and a constraint specifying that the hiring rate cannot exceed unity h 0 1 v 1, so that v 1 À 0 a 1 .
The voucher cost may be divided into two components: (i) deadweight, 0 (the cost of providing vouchers for people who would have become employed anyway) and (ii) the voucher cost of induced hiring 1 v. By equation (14), this means that the voucher cost of induced hiring must not exceed voucher revenue minus deadweight:
Thus, the optimal voucher ratio for the long-run steady state is:
Thus, for the linear hiring function (9a) and the constant firing rate (9b), the optimal voucher ratio 16
• rises at an increasing rate with hiring responsiveness 1 ; and • falls at an increasing rate with deadweight 0 and autonomous job loss ! 0 .
The intuition underlying these results is clarified in Figures 1a±c. Here the C curve represents voucher cost (equation (11)) and the R curve is voucher revenue (equation (12)), both as a function of the voucher ratio. The voucher ratio that minimizes unemployment is the maximal voucher for which voucher revenue does not fall short of voucher cost. Thus the optimal voucher lies at the intersection of the C and R curves. An increase in deadweight shifts the voucher cost curve upwards, since this causes more people to qualify for the voucher. It also shifts the voucher revenue curve downwards, since it reduces the difference between unemployment in the absence and presence of the voucher. Consequently, as shown in Figure 1a , the optimal voucher ratio falls.
An increase in hiring responsiveness raises voucher revenue (since unemployment in the presence of the voucher rises relative to unemployment in its absence) and raises the voucher cost curve (since more people get the voucher); however, the former effect dominates (see Appendix A for the details) so that the optimal voucher ratio increases as shown in Figure 1b .
Along the same lines, an increase in autonomous job loss raises the voucher cost curve (since some of the extra people who lose their jobs get the voucher) and also raises the voucher revenue curve (since it increases the difference between unemployment in the absence and presence of the voucher). As 15. Orszag and Snower (1997) achieve the same result for a much more complex model involving an infinite number of states but constant transition rates. 16.
In the context of our analysis, it is not possible to assess the influence of the replacement ratio b on the optimal voucher, since we have not specified how this replacement ratio affects the hiring and firing functions. 
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The Effectiveness of Employment Vouchers shown in Appendix A, the former effect dominates so that the optimal voucher ratio decreases as illustrated in Figure 1c .
The short-run versus long-run effectiveness of the policy
It is worth noting that our analysis of voucher effectiveness is starkly at odds with a large body of empirical evaluations undertaken in various OECD countries (NERA, 1995 (NERA, , 1997 Martin Hanblin Research, 1996; Woodbury and Spiegelman, 1987; and Institute for Employment Studies, 1994) . The standard practice in these evaluations is to measure the effectiveness of employment subsidies by seeking the following statistics: how many people in the targeted group got jobs within a limited period of time (typically a quarter or a year), how many of these people would have gained employment without the subsidy within that period, how many incumbent employees (outside the target group) were displaced by subsidized workers within that period, and how many non-employed people outside the target group were left jobless within that period even though they would have found jobs in the absence of the subsidy. This approach focuses on the short-run effects of the policy, largely ignoring the dynamic repercussions in the longer run. Although the empirical evaluations do occasionally distinguish between short-run and long-run elasticities of labour demand, they generally do not examine ± as our analysis here has done ± the effects of the policy on the transition rates between employment and unemployment, and thus they are unable to evaluate the effects of the policy once the associated lagged adjustment processes have worked themselves out. It is interesting to examine the nature of this bias. Do the empirical evaluations tend to overestimate or underestimate the long-run effects of the policy? To shed light on this issue, we will examine two features: (i) the difference between the short-run and long-run employment effects of a given voucher ratio and (ii) the difference between the short-run and long-run selffinancing, unemployment-minimizing voucher ratio. We will show how deadweight 0 , autonomous job loss ! 0 and hiring responsiveness 1 influence these features.
The difference between the short-run and long-run employment effects of a given voucher may be derived straightforwardly as follows. By equations (2), (9a) and (9b), the short-run employment rate is:
Thus, the short-run effect of the voucher (i.e. the effect in the first period) is dn t adv 1 u tÀ1 . To make this effect comparable with its long-run counterpart, we evaluate both at the long-run unemployment rate. Thus evaluated, the short-run effect becomes:
The long-run effect is: 17
By equations (18) and (17), the difference between the long-run and short-run effects of a given voucher is
which is always positive, so long as the retention rate 1 À f 1 À ! 0 exceeds the hiring rate h 0 1 v. 18 In other words, the empirical evaluations above must underestimate the employment effect of the policy.
The previous equation indicates that the difference between the long-run and short-run employment effects will be greater:
• the greater is the deadweight 0 ; • the greater is the autonomous job loss ! 0 ; and • the greater is the hiring responsiveness 1 . Now consider the difference between the optimal voucher in the long run and short run. Substituting the short-run unemployment rate u t v f vn tÀ1 1 À hvu tÀ1 into the government budget constraint equation (7), setting 17.
The long-run employment rate is:
This result does not depend on the assumption that the hiring rate is linear and that the firing rate is a constant. For the general functional forms h hvY h H v b 0 and f f vY f H v b 0, the short-run employment rate is n t hvu tÀ1 1 À f vn tÀ1 (by equations (2)), so that the short-run effect of the voucher (starting from a steady state, using equations (5a) and (5b)) is:
By equation (5a) the long-run effect is:
If condition (6) holds (so that the proportional increase in hiring exceeds the proportional increase in firing in response to the voucher), then the long-run and short-run employment effects will both be positive. Furthermore, if the retention rate 1 À f v exceeds the hiring rate hv (which holds whenever current employees have some degree of job security which currently unemployed people do not share) the long-run employment effect of the voucher will exceed the short-run effect.
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vhvu0 bu0 À bu t v 20
Furthermore, substituting the hiring function equation (9a) and the firing function equation (9b) into equation (20), we obtain:
vhv À 1 vb 0 21
The optimal short-run voucher is:
Assuming that the retention rate exceeds the hiring rate, observe that the short-run and long-run vouchers have the same voucher cost but the long-run voucher yields greater voucher revenue than the short-run voucher. Thus, the long-run voucher exceeds the short-run voucher:
This equation indicates that the voucher differential v Ã À v 0 is greater:
• the smaller is the deadweight 0 and • the smaller is the firing rate in the absence of the voucher ! 0 .
THE OPTIMAL VOUCHER IN THE PRESENCE OF DISPLACEMENT
We now consider the influence of displacement on the optimal employment voucher policy. For this purpose, we amend the firing function to make the firing rate (like the hiring rate equation (9a)) depend positively and linearly on the size of the voucher:
The usual definition of policy-induced displacement is simply the number of people who lose their jobs on account of the policy. Our dynamic analysis offers a richer account of displacement than is possible within the standard static framework, since it draws attention to the important fact that when the hiring rate h of the unemployed is less than the retention rate 1 À f of the
19.
This is an interior optimum, assuming that the non-negativity constraint v ! 0 and the upper bound on the hiring rate h 1 which implies that v 1 À 0 a 1 are redundant. employed, displacement in the short run will be greater than displacement in the long run.
In the short run, displacement may be measured by the policy-induced change in the probability that a currently employed person will be fired:
The corresponding measure is the policy-induced change in the probability that a person will be unemployed in the long-run steady state: 20
Under our assumption that the voucher has a greater proportional effect on hiring than on firing (condition (6)), this magnitude is negative. In the analysis that follows, however, we will stick to the short-run definition of displacement, measuring it by the parameter ! 1 .
The optimal voucher
The long-run unemployment rate is:
by equations (5b), (9a) and (9b H ). Thus the voucher cost is:
and the voucher revenue is:
Thus, expressing both voucher revenue and voucher cost as magnitudes in units of the voucher ratio per unemployed person and assuming (as above) that the constraints v ! 0 and h 1 are redundant, 21 the government budget constraint (under a balanced budget policy, G 0) becomes:
20.
When the transitions between labour market states are described by a Markov process, a person's long-run probability of being unemployed does not depend on initial employment status. 21.
The fire rate must also be less than one, which implies v 1 À ! 0 a! 1 . However, we have assumed that the proportional effect of a voucher on hiring is greater than that on firing, which implies: 1 a 0 b ! 1 a! 0 . If the initial hire rate is greater than the initial fire rate (as in every major industrialized country), this condition implies that the hire rate restriction is binding first. (25) and (7 H ). Thus, the optimal voucher is the largest root of the equation:
For sufficiently large b, the optimal voucher will be positive if: 22
i.e. if the ratio of hiring responsiveness to deadweight exceeds the ratio of displacement to autonomous job loss. This relation is equivalent to equation (12). Solving equation (28), we obtain the optimal voucher ratio explicitly:
As illustrated numerically in Appendix B and Section 5, the optimal voucher ratio:
• rises at a decreasing (rather than increasing) rate with hiring responsiveness 1 (for the central estimates of the other parameters); • falls at a decreasing (rather than increasing) rate with deadweight 0 and autonomous job loss ! 0 (for the central estimates of the other parameters); and • first rises and then falls with displacement (for the central estimates of the other parameters).
The short-run versus long-run effectiveness of the policy
It can be shown that in the presence of displacement (as in its absence), the long-run employment effects of balanced budget vouchers are typically larger than short-run effects. In fact, as we will see below, for a wide range of feasible 22. Equation (6) implies:
which is equivalent to equation (29).
parameter values, the optimal, self-financing voucher ratios are zero in the short run, but significantly positive in the long run. It is straightforward to show that the unemployment effect of a given voucher ratio is greater in the long run than in the short run. By equations (2), (9a) and (9b H ), the short-run employment rate with displacement is:
Thus, the employment effect of the voucher in the first period is dN t adv 1 u tÀ1 À ! 1 n tÀ1 and evaluating this expression at the long-run unemployment rate, we obtain:
The long-run employment effect under displacement is:
Thus, we find (once again) that the long-run effect exceeds the short-run effect if the denominator is less than one (which occurs under our assumption that the retention rate exceeds the hire rate). Next, it can be shown that the optimal voucher ratio is greater in the long run than in the short run. In the short run, applying the government budget constraint equation (20) for a balanced budget voucher we obtain:
Simplifying, we obtain, for v T 0:
which implies the following optimal short-run voucher:
Since displacement acts primarily to reduce the revenue from the replacement ratio b, the short-run voucher (34) is smaller than the short-run voucher (22) without displacement ! 1 0. Moreover, in the presence of displacement, the optimal long-run voucher ratio exceeds the optimal short-run voucher ratio v Ã b v 0 . Appendix B provides some explicit comparative static results. Appendix C sheds some light on the properties of optimal employment vouchers in more general contexts where the hire and fire rates are non-linear functions of the voucher. Appendix D extends the analysis above by considering voucher policies that generate a specified net deficit or surplus to the government (rather than being self-financing).
EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE POLICY
We now evaluate the effectiveness of the policy by calibrating our model and deriving the influence of the optimal voucher on unemployment for a wide range of feasible parameters. Our analysis shows that, for parameter ranges centred on values that appear reasonable for EU countries, the long-run unemployment effects of the policy are substantial and these effects significantly exceed the corresponding short-run effects.
Let the period of analysis be one quarter. A reasonable estimate for average job tenure in the EU is about ten years (40 quarters) (cf. Burgess and Rees, 1994; Simon Burgess and Rees, 1997) . With constant separation rates, a job duration estimate of 60 quarters translates into an autonomous job loss (! 0 , the separation rate in the absence of vouchers) of one-sixtieth, or 0.025.
For unemployment, the OECD reports fractions of workers who have been unemployed for over a year (four quarters). As shown in Appendix G, if the transition rate out of unemployment is h, then the steady-state proportion of people who are unemployed for more than x periods is 1 À h x . Thus, the fraction of the unemployed who are unemployed for more than a year is 1 À h 4 . The OECD figures suggest that a central estimate is that 33 per cent of the unemployed have been jobless for over a year: 1 À h 4 0X33. 23 The central estimate of the replacement ratio in our calibration exercise is set at b 0X5 which is broadly representative of the EU. However, since the optimal voucher and the corresponding effect on unemployment rises with the replacement ratio, we use this value to derive conservative estimates of the policy's effectiveness.
We calibrate the hiring responsiveness parameter 1 conservatively, setting this parameter to obtain a relatively low estimate of the effects of vouchers on unemployment. Estimates of hiring elasticities in the literature (e.g., Holzer et al., 1991, and Krueger, 1988) led Card and Krueger (1995) to conclude the elasticity of hiring with respect to the wage is within the range of 0.5 to 4.0.
The above estimates of the hiring elasticity are relevant, but not immediately applicable, to our model, since the elasticity above is defined with respect to permanent wage changes whereas the employment vouchers are short-lived. Thus the elasticity with respect to vouchers may be expected to 23.
The OECD Employment Outlook registers an OECD average of 32.9 per cent unemployment more than 12 months in 1998 as opposed to 34.7 per cent in 1997.
be substantially more than that with respect to wages. Snower (1996) provides arguments that the voucher elasticity of employment is about onethird of the corresponding wage elasticity of employment. The ratio of these two elasticities will typically be smaller than the ratio of the voucher elasticity of hiring relative to the wage elasticity of hiring, since employment depends on both hiring and separations, and a wage increase will generally reduce the separation rate while a voucher increase will increase it (on account of displacement). Thus, for our baseline calibration, we choose the conservative estimate of 0.5 for the elasticity of hiring with respect to vouchers. (Our analysis of policy effectiveness will, however, be conducted for a wide range of elasticities around this estimate.) Furthermore, in our baseline calibrations we set the elasticity of separations with respect to the voucher of 0.1 and then examine voucher effectiveness for a wide range of elasticities around this value. In practice, as noted, the elasticity depends on the existence of anti-displacement provisions. Direct estimates of displacement owing to employment subsidies have a wide range of error.
Given the above estimates of the elasticity of hiring with respect to vouchers h and the elasticity of separations with respect to vouchers s and given our estimates of deadweight 0 and autonomous job loss ! 0 , we compute the voucher effectiveness coefficient 1 and displacement ! 0 by solving the following system of equations:
where these equations are definitions of the hiring and separation elasticities and the voucher is set at its optimal level. Our baseline calibration parameters are summarized in Table 1 . We focus on balanced budget policies: G 0. In this baseline case, the optimal voucher in the steady state is 0.749 and, as a result, the steady-state unemployment rate drops from 9.4 to 5.4 per cent. However, the short-run voucher is zero, which means that self-financing policy is ineffective in the short run.
In Figures 2 to 6 , we present the optimal voucher in the short run and long run and the associated unemployment rate, for a wide range of feasible parameter values. 24 The results indicate that, for realistic elasticity values, a balancedbudget voucher can have a significant effect in reducing unemployment. 25 
24.
Observe that the baseline unemployment rate (equation (5b) with v 0) is independent of 1 Y ! 1 . 25.
We invite the reader to experiment with parameter values either using the formulae in the paper or our on-line voucher calculator. We have a Java applet available at http:// www.social-insurance.org/vouchers/vouchers.html to compute optimal vouchers using the formulae in this paper.
ß Verein fu È r Socialpolitik and Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2000 Figure 2a±b shows how optimal vouchers and unemployment vary with the deadweight in the short and long run. As the figures show, the policy is unable to have any effect on unemployment in the short run. In the long run, however, voucher policy can reduce the unemployment rate by an amount ranging from 64 per cent (a 7 percentage point drop) for low deadweight parameter of 0.17, to 55 per cent (a 7 percentage point drop) for a high deadweight parameter of 0.28. Figure 3a±b shows how the unemployment falls and the optimal voucher rises with a rise in the effectiveness of employment vouchers. Once again, the policy is ineffective in the short run, but in the long run the voucher-induced fall in the unemployment rate ranges from 13.7 per cent (a 1.3 percentage point drop) for a parameter of 0.2, to 60.7 per cent (a 5.7 percentage point drop) for a parameter of 0.5. Figure 4a±b shows how the optimal voucher and the corresponding unemployment rate rise with the autonomous job loss parameter in the presence and absence of the employment vouchers. While the policy is not selffinancing in the short run, it once again appears to be effective in the long run, when the unemployment rate falls by an amount ranging from 5 per cent (a 0.1 percentage point drop) for an autonomous job loss parameter of 0.005, to 44 per cent (a 5.5 percentage point drop) for a parameter of 0.035.
Along the same lines, Figures 5a±b and 6a±b show how the optimal voucher and corresponding unemployment rate vary with the replacement ratio and the displacement parameters. In both cases the policy has a powerful effect on the long-run unemployment rate over the entire range of parameter values. Also observe that, given the central estimates of the other parameters, the policy is not self-financing in the short run.
CONCLUSION
Unemployment benefit systems have become a costly obligation for many governments. Since these systems can provide a substantial safety net without substantial government expenditures only when the unemployment rate is low, it is not surprising that these systems have come under attack in the two decades of high unemployment experienced in many European countries and elsewhere. What has made unemployment benefit systems particularly difficult to defend when unemployment is high is that they discourage job search and thereby augment the problem they are meant to address. The analysis of this paper has suggested an alternative approach to these systems: instead of seeing unemployment benefit payments merely as support given to people on the condition that they remain jobless, they can be used as a source of funding for employment-creating policies. We have explored how employment vouchers, in reducing unemployment, create`voucher revenue' for the government (saving in terms of unemployment benefits) and how this revenue can be used to finance the vouchers themselves (wholly or partially). Thereby unemployment benefits become less of a drag on government finances and on labour market performance, and turn into a useful resource instead.
In recent years, policy-makers have come increasingly to recognize the potential importance of subsidizing the jobs of currently unemployed people. But despite the growing interest in the design of such policies, there has been little dynamic analysis of the optimal policies and their short-term and longterm employment effects. This paper provides a simple analytical framework for doing so.
APPENDIX A: COMPARATIVE STATICS IN THE ABSENCE OF DISPLACEMENT
This appendix reviews some comparative statics results for the basic model without displacement which are shown graphically in Figures (1)±(4) .
Deadweight
The effect on the voucher cost is:
by equation (11). The effect on the voucher revenue (using equation (12)) is:
Thus, by equation (16), the overall effect is:
This implies that the optimal voucher v is the largest root of the equation:
where:
To interpret this result simply, we note that since C b 0, the optimal voucher is bounded below by B:
which agrees with the formula in equation (16) when G 0. Since the expected time workers spend employed after receiving a voucher is 1a! 0 , the third term on the right-hand side of equation (D.2) may be interpreted as a government spending multiplier.
APPENDIX E: ILLUSTRATIVE MICROFOUNDATIONS FOR THE HIRING AND FIRING RATES
The probabilities of hiring h and firing f have been derived from various microeconomic foundations in the literature. 26 Since our analysis is concerned with these probabilities only through their response to employment vouchers, we will consider only a very rudimentary derivation of these probabilities.
Suppose that the productivity a of a recently hired worker is a random variable uniformly distributed over the interval 1 Y 2 Y 1 Y 2 b 0 and is independently distributed across the newly hired workers. The productivity of 26.
For example, Phelps (1994) .
ß Verein fu È r Socialpolitik and Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2000 an incumbent employee is a constant A, where A b . We let w be the real wage, v be the`voucher ratio' (the ratio of the voucher to the wage for newly hired employees), and c h and c f (positive constants) be the hiring and firing costs per worker as a ratio of the wage, respectively. A worker is hired whenever 27 a À w vw À c h w b 0 (i.e. the entrant generates positive profit). Thus, the hiring probability (i.e. the probability that a b 1 À v c h w is h 1 2 À 1 2 À 1 À v c h w (E.1)
An incumbent employee is fired when
A À w`maxa À 1 À vw À c h c f wY Àc f w i.e. firing occurs when (i) the profit generated by the incumbent is less than the profit generated by the entrant, minus the labour turnover costs c h c f (in which case the incumbent is replaced by an entrant). 28 or (ii) the loss generated by the incumbent is less than the firing cost (in which case the incumbent's position is kept vacant). For simplicity, we assume that 1 b w c h so that the firing condition reduces to A À w`a À 1 À v À c h À c f w and the incumbent is replaced. Thus, the firing probability (i.e. the probability that a b AÀ v c f c h Á w is
Assume that wages are set before the employment decisions are made. The wages are the outcome of a Nash bargain between each firm and its incumbent employees. The firm's profit per incumbent employee under the bargaining agreement is A À w; under disagreement, the firm pays c f w; 29 thus, the profit surplus is A À w Á 1 À c f . Assuming for simplicity that the wage is set after the firm's firing decision is made, 30 the incumbent employee's payoff is w. Then the Nash bargaining problem is:
27.
For simplicity, we assume that the firm has a one-period time horizon. 28.
We assume that the incumbent is fired even though he may generate positive profit, because the firm has a fixed amount of capital and a fixed capital±labour ratio.
29.
For simplicity, we assume that, under disagreement, the worker produces no output, is paid no wage and engages in industrial action whose cost to the firm is high enough to make the firm indifferent between retaining and firing the worker, as in Lindbeck and Snower (1990) , for example.
30.
This assumption is made only for the sake of algebraic simplicity; it is not necessary for the derivation of the hiring and firing functions (E.7) and (E.8). If the wage were set before the firing decision is made, the employee's payoff would be 1 À f w and the Nash maximand would be a third-order polynomial in w.
where " (a constant) is the bargaining power of the employee relative to that of the employer, and the firing rate is given by equation (E.2). Solving, we obtain the equilibrium wage:
Substituting the equilibrium wage into the hiring rate (equation (E.1)) we find:
Similarly, substituting w Ã into the firing rate (equation (4)), we obtain:
We note from equations (E.5) and (E.6) that the voucher ratio v stimulates hiring and firing. (Firing is encouraged through the displacement of incumbent employees by subsidized new entrants. 31 ) In general we may express these effects as: 32
Equations (E.7) and (E.8) could be derived for a wide variety of existing labour market models, and equations (E.1) and (E.2) are simply illustrative.
APPENDIX F: THE FRACTION OF LONG-TERM UNEMPLOYED
This appendix derives the fraction of long-term unemployed used in the calibration exercise. The difference equations for unemployment:
v tYx 1 À hv tÀ1YxÀ1
31.
In practice, displacement is, to some degree, a matter of policy choice since the policy-maker can reduce displacement, say, by fining employers who can be shown to have replaced incumbent employees by new recruits. The greater the degree to which anti-displacement provisions are monitored and enforced, the less the firing rate will depend on the vouchers and, since these provisions generally raise the cost of recruitment, they also reduce the responsiveness of the hiring rate to the vouchers. 32.
In practice, the functional form will depend, in addition to the factors enumerated above, on the degree of heterogeneity in the productivities of workers and jobs.
